黑料吃瓜群网

Australia has weathered the coronavirus pandemic better than many other countries, recording just over so far. But various errors, such as the , show we can 鈥� and must 鈥� do better.

The crisis has reignited a long-running debate about the need for an .

Opposition leader Anthony Albanese this week, as did Australian Medical Association President . It is likely these calls will grow louder as the pandemic progresses, especially if we see a second wave in Australia.

Support has been building for decades

The proposal for an AusCDC has been debated for at least the past .

In 2012, a parliamentary committee on trans-border health threats received submission after submission supporting the creation of an AusCDC, prompting the committee to into the feasibility of its creation.

However, after a limited consultation and six-year delay, the federal government responded by saying a centralised agency to coordinate health emergency responses .

This finding goes against the consensus of the . It goes against the advice of the . Worse still, it goes against basic common sense.

The need for a coordinated and improved response to health emergencies across Australia鈥檚 multiple jurisdictions has been flagged many times during COVID-19. So what鈥檚 stopping us?

Politics getting in the way

The short answer is politics. While the public health community has long supported the creation of an AusCDC, it has repeatedly fallen foul of state and federal politics.

NSW and Victoria have consistently held any CDC should be based in their respective states, while others have argued for Canberra.

State governments have also resisted calls for a national CDC on the basis it might 鈥渟teal鈥� their top public health experts.

The federal Department of Health, meanwhile, has reportedly flagged its discomfort with an .

The case for an AusCDC

Australia鈥檚 pandemic preparedness efforts throughout the early 2000s established a solid foundation for the national COVID-19 response, but successive governments dropped the ball.

Multiple recommendations to continue strengthening our preparedness efforts were ignored. Our national influenza vaccine manufacturing capacity that once guaranteed Australians priority access .

And our national medical stockpile of personal protective equipment appears to have been subjected to budget cuts and efficiency savings to the point where there was insufficient stock when the pandemic struck.

While our politicians will no doubt point to the National Cabinet as evidence Australia managed the crisis well, its creation was a stop-gap measure that ignored Australia鈥檚 existing pandemic governance arrangements.

Admittedly, an AusCDC would not fix all of these problems. But there is a reason why countries like and , as well as entities like the , have followed the US lead in creating one.

In fact, Australia is the without such a centralised disease control agency.

Basing a new AusCDC in the north

Building an AusCDC is only one small part of the equation. Our region is one of the most disaster-prone areas of the world. Added to that, it comprises nearly two-thirds of the world鈥檚 population, many of whom live in high-density urban environments .

When the next crisis emerges 鈥� and it will 鈥� Australia will have an important role to play.

For these reasons, it makes little sense to locate the new AusCDC in Canberra or Sydney. It needs to be as close to Asia as possible 鈥� in Darwin.

are already based there to respond rapidly to regional disasters.

Locating a new AusCDC in Darwin would address one of the of developing Australia鈥檚 north, guaranteeing the creation of new jobs and infrastructure.

If built on the AusMAT foundations, it would complement the Australian Defence Force鈥檚 efforts to , such as malaria, dengue, even Zika.

This would provide new opportunities for civil and military cooperation in health, and counter China鈥檚 growing influence through its across the region.

We could be doing more

An AusCDC would allow us to add another component 鈥� a new Australian Public Health Corps (AHPC), a uniformed service of epidemiologists, nurses, pharmacists, physicians and even engineers that could be deployed at a moment鈥檚 notice to respond to disasters or health emergencies.

This workforce would be based on the , which has responded to disasters such as Ebola outbreaks in Africa, Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. It also provides healthcare services to Native Americans living on remote reservations.

The same concept could work with an Australian Public Health Corps, staffed partially by highly skilled Indigenous health care professionals, who could provide health care services to rural and remote communities.

This would not only aid our efforts, but also provide Indigenous healthcare workers with new employment opportunities similar to the programme that has proven so successful.

We must look to the future and ensure we are better prepared for the next pandemic or regional health emergency. The time for the creation of an Australian Centre for Disease Control is well past due.

, Associate professor, and , Honorary Lecturer,

This article is republished from under a Creative Commons license. Read the .

Image credit: 漏stock.adobe.com/au/PordeeStudio

Originally published